Partial ownership can be used as a screening device by a foreign firm which wants to merge with a local firm whose productivity is private information.
Introduction
The global economy has witnessed an unprecedented surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) The substantial share of cross-border mergers in FDI demonstrates that combining assets across countries has been expected to lead to large expected merger gains. 2 However, not all mergers are success stories, and even substantial merger losses do happen from time to time, 3 demonstrating that a foreign firm does not always know the size of after merger gains when specifying the merger proposal. The obvious reason is asymmetric information between a foreign firm and a local target, and this is the first starting-point of this analysis. 4 The second starting-point is the observation that mergers do not necessarily imply a complete takeover 1 The US$ 183 billion deal was the largest corporate merger at that time and made the Vodafone group the largest company on the London stock market. The world's largest corporate merger between America Online and Time Warner was finalized in January 2001. 2 If two existing firms merge in a market of strategic substitutes in the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) , a successful merger must reduce production costs substantially according to the merger paradox (see Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983 , Perry and Porter, 1985 , and Farrell and Shapiro, 1990 . The merger paradox is weakened by product differentiation (Lommerud and Sorgard, 1997) and if firms compete in a market of strategic complements (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985) . 3 For example, Vodaphone shares experienced a loss in value of nearly three quarters two years after the takeover. Gugler et al (2003) report a large proportion of profit reducing mergers, with no significant differences in patterns across countries. 4 Asymmetric information seems to be important for mergers. For example, Shen and Reuer (2003) demonstrate that private targets are less preferred compared to public firms because they offer less information on assets.
by the foreign firm. For example, Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) show that the degree of foreign equity participation rises with foreign assets. Desai, Foley and Hines (2002) investigate the determinants of partial ownership of foreign affiliates of U.S. firms. Partial ownership is a universal feature of FDI in general and mergers in particular, meaning that mergers are not equivalent to complete takeovers. Table 1 shows the structure of Japanese foreign direct investment to Europe and demonstrates that mixed ownership structures must not be ignored. In particular, the average principal investor's equity ownership share of investments which are not qualified as wholly owned subsidiaries was 55.05 % in this period. Note that Table 1 does only count the number of investments and thus underestimates the role of cross-border mergers as they are known to be larger in volume than other forms of foreign direct investment.
Given this background, this paper explains partial ownership by information asymmetries. The model is as simple as possible and applies to both vertical and horizontal cross-border mergers: A foreign firm considering the acquisition of a local firm does not know the productivity of the potential target, because it is private information of the target firm. The productivity of the target determines the scope of merger gains.
one target firm and offers a set of contracts (as a take it or leave it offer).
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If the foreign firm specified only the acquisition price, it would suffer from the lemons problem: unless the acquisition price is very high, only the bad productivities will accept, but the good productivities will reject.
Alternatively, the merger proposal could be made dependent on the future performance of the target, like future output. However, takeover contracts based on future performance are hard to find, and the reason is the limited liability of the previous owner. Since the future profitability of a target may be uncertain, it is sensible to assume that a previous owner cannot be held responsible for after merger losses so foreign firms cannot claim a part of the acquisition price back if their expectations are not met. But if performancerelated contracts cannot be written, the foreign firm may still use partial ownership as a screening device. A productive target can be expected to accept a high share of after merger profits as a compensation for accepting partial ownership of the foreign firm even if the sales price for foreign partial ownership is not large. Conversely, a less productive target will not accept this offer, as it correctly anticipates that after merger profits will be small. Hence, leaving a part of the future after merger profit to the target may qualify for a proper incentive scheme. Thereby, our model combines the aspects of adverse selection and incomplete contracts, and discusses how partial ownership as a screening device may (partially) solve the problem. (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993, Chi, 1996) , if agency costs increase in the foreign share of a joint venture (Nakamura and Yeung, 1994) or if foreign intangible assets are substantial (Nakamura and Xie, 1998).
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The difference from this paper is that those papers do not consider different degrees of partial ownership whereas this paper will endogenize the degree of partial ownership.
Mergers have also received a lot of attention in the finance and industrial organization literature. One strand of this literature has dealt with the division of merger gains after a profitable target has been identified by an investor. Hart (1980, 1981) found that acquisitions of profitable targets face a free rider problem in case of small shareholders. Small shareholders will sell only if they get the complete pro rata merger gains because their influence on the success of a complete takeover is marginal. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) have shown that this problem can be overcome if shareholders exist who hold a large share of equities. (2000) demonstrate that large shareholders may imply tunneling, i.e., transferring resources out of a company to the controlling shareholder at the disadvantage of other shareholders. Another strand of this literature has dealt with the optimal behavior of potential investors before a merger might be found profitable. For example, Burkart (1995) shows that a toehold leads to excessive bidding of its holder if the target is eventually sold in a secondprice auction because the winner has to pay the loser's share. Bulow, Huang 9 See also Desai, Foley and Hines (2002) . 10 See also Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) and Ferguson (1994) . 
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This literature thus emphasizes the strategic effects of partial ownership during and before merger negotiations take place. However, partial ownership is not a part of the proposed merger deal and hence not a result of a merger as this paper will show. Our model has some features in common with share contracts (see Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995 , Canjels and Volz, 2001 , Dai, 2004 , and for a general treatment of wealth-constrained agents, see Lewis and Sappington, 2000) . The difference is that share contracts assume a binding wealth constraint for the partner who is (still) carrying out future actions, whereas our model considers a target whose owner does not take any future action once the merger deal is done, except of possibly participating in after merger profits. The paper is closest to Hviid and Prendergast (1993) who also consider a target with private information and a merger proposal as a take it or leave it offer. The difference is that both firms are already rivals in a market and both have private information, so the market performance can be given by a Bayesian equilibrium. A rejected proposal signals a high profitability of the target and increases the target's profit and decreases bidder's profit. In our model, the foreign firm is a newcomer to the market, and to our knowledge no paper has dealt with partial ownership as a screening device in a simple model of incomplete contracts and adverse selection.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, and section 3 determines the equilibrium offer of the foreign firm.
Section 4 presents two examples for a horizontal merger in a Cournot market, and section 5 concludes the paper.
11 Partial ownership is also considered in models of vertical integration. Dasgupta and Tao (2000) show that equity participation by a downstream firm in an upstream firm can be beneficial if investment of the upstream firm can be either specific or general because it reduces the outside options of the upstream firm if this firm can also bargain with other downstream firms. See also Greenlee and Rascovich (2005) for a model of partial vertical ownership which demonstrates an invariance result of ownership structures if downstream firms have symmetric costs.
The model
The sequence of decisions is as follows. Applying the Harsanyi transformation, a Nature move picks the productivity of the target which is unknown to the foreign firm. In the first stage, the (risk-neutral) foreign firm determines the set of contracts which it will offer to the target firm. Each contract specifies a transfer T to the target firm in case of acceptance. Furthermore, it specifies a share s with 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 as the share of after merger profits which will be left to the target. and is common knowledge. M (β) denotes the after merger profit, and Π(β) denotes the independent profit of the target if the target rejects the offer, so that M (β)−Π(β) is the merger gain. All total derivatives with respect to the type β will be denoted by a dot. We will assume thatṀ >Π > 0, so that both profits and the merger gain increase with productivity. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume also that a merger is always profitable irrespective of the type, i.e., M (β) > Π(β) > 0, ∀β.
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Both M and Π may reflect sums of discounted future profits.
14 Suppose that the foreign firm's strategy is restricted such that only com- 12 The case of s = 1 is equivalent to a license contract. 13 Allowing merger losses would not change the main results except that an offer should bunch certain low productivity types such that these types will never accept any contract. Furthermore, any outside option of the foreign firm is irrelevant as long as it does not depend on the type of the target to which a merger offer is made. For example, a foreign firm could also enter a local market by a greenfield investment or by exports.
14 However, we do not assume that the foreign firm does not learn the efficiency at some point, as this would lead to ratchet effects and the general impossibility of a fully separating equilibrium which is beyond the scope of this paper. For the ratchet effect in a dynamic procurement model with adverse selection and moral hazard, see Laffont and Tirole (1988). 6 plete takeovers are possible. In this case, the foreign firm faces the lemons problem as productive targets will agree to a takeover proposal only for a substantial transfer, but this substantial transfer will also be accepted by all less productive types. The transfer offered will determine the critical productivity β * by T = Π(β * ), as type β * is indifferent between accepting the proposal and turning it down. All lower productivity types will accept the offer. The foreign firm maximizes its expected payof
The expected payoffṼ is the expected merger gain, reduced by the transfer times the probability that the proposal will be accepted. The first derivative
Note that dṼ /dβ *
Given thatṼ is quasi-concave, the optimal offer implies
According to (3), the foreign firm will make an offer which will be accepted
by all types if and only if f (B)[M (B) − Π(B)] ≥Π(B).
In all other cases, the lemons problem prevails and adverse selection will occur.
Equilibrium offers
In the previous section, the strategy of the foreign firm has been restricted to proposals of a complete takeover. We will now allow partial ownership. As the target's productivity is private information, the target is free to accept any contract. As common in the literature on contracts under asymmetric information, letβ denote the announced type of the target which means that the target accepts a contract which the foreign firm has designed for typeβ.
U (β,β) denotes a β-type target's payoff of accepting a proposal designed for typeβ:
True revelation requires that
which leads to
requiring that the share of after merger profits left to the target should not decrease with productivity. Less productive targets can be held back from picking a contract designed for a productive target only if productive targets are supposed to receive a higher share of after merger profits. However, Proposition 1 demonstrates that this evident requirement may be at odds with the foreign firm reaping merger gains completely.
Proposition 1 IfΠ/Π >M /Ṁ , a fully separating equilibrium exists. If Π/Π <M /Ṁ , no fully separating equilibrium exists.
Proof: True revelation is the optimal strategy of the target if
leading toṪ (β) ≤ 0. The change in total payoff iṡ
The foreign firm maximizes its payoff by separating types such that U (β) = 0 which is equivalent to U (b) = 0,U = U β = 0 and requires
Due toṀ >Π, s(β) < 1, but (9) is feasible only ifṡ ≥ 0: hold of all merger gains. This can be seen from the left panel of Figure 1 which shows that, starting from b, the merger profit change becomes larger than the independent profit change, and hence only a permanent decrease in s could guarantee that no merger gains are left to the target. In order to make each type indifferent between acceptance and rejection, the foreign firm has to pay less out of the merger profits to a more productive target. But this is in conflict with the requirement that true revelation warrants that the share of after merger profits should increase with productivity. If merger gains are concave (see the right panel of Figure 1 ), both incentive compatibility and the complete transfer of merger gains to the foreign firm are possible because the merger profit change becomes less than the independent profit change so that s will be able to increase with productivity.
IfΠ/Π <M /Ṁ across the whole range of productivities, the foreign firm will make only a "one size fits all" offer. This offer does not depend on types, and any equilibrium is at least partially pooling.
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Let {T, s} denote the contract offer in terms of transfer T and share s, such that the payoff of the target in case of acceptance is equal to
convex merger profits concave merger profits • Specifying a contract {s, T } such that s ≤ s guarantees that the payoff of targets decreases with their productivity. In this case, the lemons problem is still prevalent but may be reduced by partial ownership. It depends on the size of T how many low productivity types will accept.
If T is sufficiently large, all types will accept. We will refer to this case as aiming at the low end of productivities.
• Specifying a contract {s, T } such that s ≥ s is an option which is not available without partial ownership. A sufficiently high s will guarantee that the payoff of targets will increase with productivity. Once again, if T is sufficiently large, all types will accept the offer. However, if T is not, only high productivity types will accept. Thus, partial ownership allows discrimination against low productivity types, and therefore we will refer to this case as aiming at the high end of productivities.
• Finally, a contract {s, T } could be offered with s ∈]s, s[. In that case, all types will again accept if T is sufficiently large. However, if it is not, low and/or high productivity types will accept whereas intermediate productivity types will reject the offer. The reason is that theU = 0−line represents a minimum payoff. If s = 0,U = −Π < 0, but as s increases,U increases and is equal toṀ −Π > 0 when s becomes unity. Accordingly, if the merger proposal specifies a share s ∈]s, s[, the payoff of targets decreases with β until theU = 0−line is reached and increases afterwards. We will refer to this case as aiming at both ends of productivities.
We cannot determine in general in which range we will find the foreign firm's best strategy.
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However, we are able to show that partial ownership will occur if the foreign firm's expected payoff function is well-behaved: neither s = 0 nor s = 1 is an equilibrium strategy of the foreign firm. Proposition 2
shows that the foreign firm will never go to the extremes.
Proposition 2 IfΠ/Π <M /Ṁ and the foreign firm's expected payoff is quasi-concave in β and s,
(i) the foreign firm will offer a share s * such that 0 < s * < 1,
(ii) the foreign firm will offer a share s *
= s(s) if aiming at the low (high) end of productivities maximizes its expected payoff.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Hence, partial ownership will also play a role if no fully separating equilibrium exists. Furthermore, the equilibrium share will be either s or s unless aiming at both ends of productivities does best. The optimal strategy depends crucially on the distribution of types. For example, if the distribution of types is skewed such that the probability of facing high productivity types is much larger than facing low productivity types, it may be an optimal strategy to aim at the high end of productivities and to exclude low productivities by a contract offer which specifies a low T (and s). If the distribution 17 We will present the results of a simulation in the next section.
is skewed such that the probability of dealing with an intermediate productivity type is low, it may be the best strategy to make an offer which will be accepted by low and high productivity types only. The next section will explore these options further by presenting an example of a Cournot target market with two different assumptions on cost saving due to a cross-border horizontal merger.
The example of a Cournot target market
This section demonstrates the scope of partial ownership as a screening device for a Cournot target market. The setup is as simple as it can be for a potentially successful horizontal merger. The local market is assumed to be served by n heterogeneous firms. Heterogeneity implies that marginal costs differ across firms. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the foreign firm can enter the market only by a merger.
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The foreign firm has observed the local market and is well aware of aggregate output and equilibrium prices without merger. However, it cannot observe market shares, and it does not know the marginal cost of an individual target. In order to simplify matters further, we assume that marginal costs are common knowledge among local firms. All firms can be expected to behave in the Cournot fashion.
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The local firms serve the market of a representative consumer with quasilinear preferences which give rise to an inverse demand function p = 1 − Q.
Each local firm i produces with a constant marginal cost c i = 1 − β with
c denotes the average marginal cost. Condition (12) guarantees that all firms produce and that any marginal cost is not negative. β denotes the individual 18 Note that this section's model does not involve the merger paradox because we do not consider the merger of two already active firms in this market but the market entry of a foreign firm via merger and partial ownership. 19 If marginal costs were not common knowledge among local firms, oligopolistic competition would result in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This would not change results substantially, but would make determining the equilibrium much more complicated. Without merger, solving for the first-order conditions and the optimal output levels yields the individual Cournot profit
which -from the viewpoint of the foreign firm -depends on the observable number of firms, on the deducible average marginal cost and on the unobservable productivity of the target. Note that the independent profit (13) is monotically increasing and convex in β:
Π andΠ will serve as the point of reference for the two different scenarios of horizontal cross-border mergers in the Cournot market which we will consider now. We will refer to the term which decides on the possibility of a fully separating equilibrium as ∆, i.e.,
where the subscript i ∈ {1, 2} denotes the merger scenario we consider. If ∆ i is positive (negative), a (no) fully separating equilibrium exists (see Proposition 1).
Exogenous cost reduction
The case of an exogenous cost reduction is the simplest case to deal with.
The basic assumption is that combining both firms' assets leads to a certain (exogenous) reduction in marginal cost. This reduction, of course, depends on the type of the target. This subsection assumes that the after merger marginal cost is equal to 1 − αβ with α > 1.
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The merged firm will compete with the other rivals in the Cournot fashion, and its after merger profit will be equal to
Appendix A.3 shows that ∆ 1 > 0. Hence, if a merger in a Cournot target market reduces the marginal cost by a certain percentage, the foreign firm is able to reap the whole merger surplus. The optimal set of contracts will specify partial ownership such that the share s will increase with the productivity of the target. Due to (9) , (14) and (A.9) of Appendix A.3, the optimal share to be offered is equal to
Our specification allows us to do some comparative statics exercises. First, we observe that
An increase in the average marginal cost will lead to a high powered incentive scheme. The share s 1 increases withc because a productive target's profits are larger the less productive all other rival firms are. Second, an increase in α will lead to a low powered incentive scheme:
An increase in α increases merger profits. Less of the merger profit has to be given away to the target in order to make the target indifferent between acceptance and rejection if the (exogenous) productivity of the merger increases.
Endogenous cost reduction
For the case of an endogenous cost reduction, we assume that it needs more than just combining assets but only an investment of the merged firm can achieve a cost reduction. Furthermore, the size of this cost-reducing investment is common knowledge before it comes to output decisions. In this sense, this subsection deals with a potential four-stage game: in the first stage, the foreign firm makes an offer (or a set of offers) to the local firm with unknown productivity, in the second stage, this offer will be accepted or rejected. In case of rejection, the game continues in the usual Cournot fashion. In case of acceptance, the type of the firm is revealed and the merged firm decides on the size of the cost-reducing investment. Once this investment is made and known by rival firms, all firms compete in the Cournot fashion.
The assumption that the type is revealed once the offer is accepted deserves some further discussion as it is less restrictive than it looks at first glance. From Propositions 1 and 2 we know that any accepted equilibrium offer will lead to a share s ∈]0, 1[. Partial ownership implies that the previous owner is still in the boat, and has thus no interest in rocking it but would like to make sure that the optimal investment level will be realized. Otherwise, her part of the after merger profit will be lower. Therefore, true revelation after the merger deal is done seems to be obvious. We have already solved the subgame subsequent to rejection. For the case of acceptance, this subsection assumes that the marginal cost in the last stage is equal to 1 − β − φx, where x denotes the size of cost-reducing investment, and φ denotes the efficiency of this investment. The marginal cost is lower the larger the productivity and the investment are. Investment is costly for the merged firm, and we assume that this investment cost is linear-quadratic and equal to γx + δx 2 /2. Note that there is also an additional strategic effect which goes beyond cost saving. The investment serves as a commitment to be more aggressive in the commodity market because a low marginal cost will steal business from other firms.
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Appendix A.4 has the details of this case and shows that ∆ 2 < 0. The reason why the change in merger profits increases more strongly than the change in independent profits with the target's productivity is the behavior of the optimal investment level with β (see A.15in Appendix A.4). An increase in productivity makes cost-reducing investment more profitable and thereby adds overproportionally to the increase in merger profits. The foreign firm is therefore not able to reap all merger gains and to separate types simultaneously, so that no equilibrium offer will be fully separating.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, we cannot determine the equilibrium strategy in general if no fully separating equilibrium exists. Table 2 shows the result of a simulation which assumes that the productivity β is uniformly distributed between 0.4 and 0.6.
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The results of three different scenarios are reported. Without partial ownership, the foreign firm can only do terribly because the probability that its best s = 0−offer will be accepted is extremely low. The possibility of partial ownership changes this result drastically.
25
If the foreign firm aims at the high end, it will optimally discriminate against low productivities. Although the scope for this policy is not very large in this simulation, the improvement compared to the s = 0−case is tremendous. If it aims at the low end, it will optimally include all types which actually turns the result without partial ownership completely around.
Aiming at the low end does best in this simulation. In this environment, partial ownership serves both as a screening device and as a tool for maximizing the expected after merger gains of the foreign firm.
We could distinguish two cases. If the increase in independent profits with the productivity is larger than the respective increase in after merger profits, a separating equilibrium exists. The foreign firm offers a set of contracts which implies revelation of the local firm, and the foreign firm gets the whole merger gain. If the increase in independent profits with the productivity is less than the respective increase in after merger profits, no fully separating equilibrium exists. In that case, the type of the offer depends on the distribution of types. The foreign firm may aim at the low end of productivities and possibly discriminate against high productivity types, or aim at the high end of productivities and possibly discriminate against low productivity types, or aim at both ends of productivities and possibly discriminate against intermediate productivity types. The last two options are not available without partial ownership.
The model has assumed that the foreign firm makes a take it or leave it offer which is either rejected or accepted by the target. This is obviously a shortcut which highlights the information asymmetry. Generalizing the model such that negotiations could involve several offers, and possibly counter-offers, would add much more complexity to the bargaining process. Models of bargaining under one-sided private information have made a lot of progress (see Kennan and Wilson, 1993 , for a survey) so that any attempt to generalize this model is not hopeless, but has been beyond the scope of this paper. It is left to future research how more involved negotiation processes including due diligence and other screening devices affect the equilibrium ownership structure of merged firms.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
It is sufficient to show that the optimal s is equal to s 
The partial derivative w.r.t. the type is 
and is positive because ofṀ > 0 and Jensen's Inequality Theorem, so that the optimal s must be equal to s if s ∈ [0, s]. Maximizing the expected payoff of the foreign firm aiming at the high end of the market is equivalent to
A.3 Merger profits with exogenous cost reduction
From (16), we can derive that the merger profits are also monotonically increasing and convex in productivities, Since the productivity of the target is revealed once the offer is accepted, the merged firm will maximize its profit (A.14) over x which leads to an optimal investment level of due to restriction (A.13).
